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Much of the research done in Artificial Intelligence
involves investigating and developing methods of
incorporating uncertainty reasoning and representation into
expert systems. Several methods have been proposed and
attempted for handling uncertainty in problem solving
situations. The theories range from numerical approaches
based on strict probabilistic reasoning to non-numeric
approaches based on logical reasoning. This study
investigates a number of these approaches including Bayesian
Probability, Mycin Certainty Factors, Dempster-Shafer Theory
of Evidence, Fuzzy Set Theory, Possibility Theory and non
monotonic logic. Each of these theories and their
underlying formalisms are explored by means of examples.
The discussion concentrates on a comparison of the different
approaches, noting the type of uncertainty that they best
represent.
CR Categories





Keywords : Uncertainty, approximate reasoning,
Dempster-
Shafer Theory of Evidence, Fuzzy set theory
Table of Contents
1 . Introduction 3
2 . The Nature of Uncertainty 6
3. Probability Theory 10
3 . 1 Background: What are probabilities? 10
3 . 2 Bayesian Probability Theory 14




3.2.3 Statistical Independence Assumptions 19
3.2.4 Ignorance 21
3 . 3 Mycin - An Early Expert System 22
3.3.1 Mycin Certainty Factors 23




3.4 Dempster-Shafer Mathematical Theory of Evidence 33
3.4.1 Representation of Uncertain Information 33
3.4.2 Belief , Commonality, Plausibility
- An Example... 38
3.4.3 Combining Evidence from Multiple sources 4 0
3.4.4 Demster's Rule of Combination - Examples 4 2
3.4.5 Ignorance 48
3 . 5 Comparison of Probability-based approaches 50
3.5.1 Representation of Belief 50
3.5.2 Ignorance 52
3.5.3 Prior Probability
- Problem of Subjectivity .... 53
3.5.4 Assumptions: Statistical Independence and
Mutual Exclusivity 54
3.5.5 Inferencing methods 56
4 . Fuzzy Set Theory 58
4 . 1 Definition of Fuzzy Sets 59
4.2 Fuzzy Logic 63
4 . 3 Possibility Theory 65
4 . 4 Ignorance 67
4.5 Comparison of Possibility Theory and Probability 68
5 . Non-monotonic Logic 74
5.1 Basic Characteristics 75
5 . 2 Modal Logic 7 6
5.3 Doyle's Truth Maintenance System 77





Every day people are faced with the dilemma of making
decisions and solving problems in uncertain environments.
These domains can be characterized in several ways. The
information obtained could only be partial, in that answers
to several questions are not known. The available
information also could be approximate, in that all the
required answers are known but they are not totally
accurate. The information obtained from multiple sources
also could be conflicting or inconsistent. If the available
information is uncertain, then the problem can be solved
only with uncertainty.
Expert systems created to support people in decision
making must be designed with the ability to cope with these
uncertain domains. The goal in expert system design is to
combine
* expert'
knowledge of a domain with
* expert'
ability
to reason and conceptualize about a domain. Several methods
have been proposed and attempted for handling uncertainty in
problem solving situations. The theories range from
numerical approaches based on strict probabilistic reasoning
to totally non-numeric approaches based on logical reasoning
or specifically, first order predicate calculus. Each of
these theories is supported by different assumptions and/or
interpretations of other existing theories. Therefore, the
uncertainty best handled by each is quite different.
It is the primary objective of this thesis to
investigate six different approaches that have been
proposed by AI researchers for problem solving and decision
making in uncertain domains. The theories that will be
reviewed are: Bayesian Probability Theory, Mycin Certainty
Factors, Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence, Fuzzy Set
Theory, Possibility Theory and non-monotonic logic. The
discussion of each theory will focus primarily on four
general areas. The first area is concerned with how each
theory represents the uncertain information or evidence.
Secondly, the methods used for combining uncertain
information from different sources will be examined along,
with the underlying assumptions that are required. How each
theory handles some special cases of uncertainty such as
ignorance or conflicting information then will be discussed.
Finally we will look at how inferences can be made using the
information from each theory.
Chapter Two will describe different types of
uncertainty and how they arise in problem solving
situations. An overview of how people process information
for decision making and task resolution also will be
included. In Chapter Three the Bayesian Probability Theory,
Mycin Certainty Factors and the Dempster-Shafer Theory of
Evidence will be presented as three very distinct yet
related interpretations of probability. Chapter Four will
discuss Fuzzy Set theory and Zadeh's Possibility Theory.
Chapter Five will be concerned with non-monotonic logic as a
non-numeric approach to reasoning with uncertainty- In
Chapter Six the strong and weak aspects of each approach
will be summarized.
Chapter Two
The Nature of Uncertainty
The complex domains within which people make decisions
are very diverse and dynamic. Though each situation is
often unique in many ways, the underlying decision process
usually can be characterized by three primary steps [Sage,
1987]. The first step is the formulation of the decision
problem. In this step the desired objectives and necessary
requirements are identified, and all the potentially
acceptable alternative solutions are generated. The second
step involves the analysis of all these alternative
solutions to evaluate the impacts and costs of the
alternatives. In the last step an interpretation of the
analysis done in step two is made and the most appropriate
alternative for implementation or further evaluation is
selected. In order to actually solve problems, there is a
need for a tremendous amount of iteration back to earlier
steps when either more information is needed or new
information has an effect on a previously selected
alternative.
Information is without doubt the most important building
block of this decision process model. The first step in
understanding human reasoning is to characterize and
understand the information used by people for problem
resolution. In order to understand how information
processing is done, particular attention must be paid to how
the information is aquired, how the information is
represented, and how it then is used to make inferences.
The situation within which people are forced to make
decisions is often very complex in that several alternative
solutions are possible. In some cases, the best alternative
can be chosen quickly and with little difficulty. More
commonly, however, the choice is not very clear cut due to
the nature of the available information. The evidence or
information that is available is often characterized as
being partial, inaccurate, inconsistent, vague or otherwise
ill-suited for a positive judgement to be made. Therefore,
people are forced to make decisions based on uncertain
information.
There are a number of reasons that evidential
information could be partial or incomplete. It could be due
to the fact that the tools required to obtain all the
required information are not readily available. This could
be a result of the high cost of obtaining the proper tools
or the fact that the actual technology required to obtain
the information has not been developed adequately. Often,
when a time constraint is placed on a decision process, all
the information cannot be collected quickly enough, forcing
a decision to be made based on partial information.
The sources of our information, whether they be an
electronic sensor or another person, are inherently
imperfect. Therefore, the information that we obtain from
these sources could in fact be inaccurate. In order to
solve the majority of the problems we face, we rely on
consulting with multiple sources. The information from
these sources is then combined to support a decision. It is
possible that the information obtained from one source could
be either inconsistent or actually conflicting with the
information from another source. In order to continue the
problem solving process, these errors and conflicts must be
recognized. Once an error has been recognized, additional
tests can be made to resolve the discrepancy, or more data
can be collected in an effort to outweigh the false
information.
People do not always approach decision making in a
formal, rational manner. Their decision making processes
are strongly biased by how they perceive the current
x state'
of the world surrounding them. Unfortunately, this
perceptual information describing the
state'
of the world
is not easily expressed in simple truths and falsities. As
this information is translated to a formal representation
scheme for expert system development, it becomes less
accurate, more inconsistent with its original meaning, or at
times it is lost all together.
It is not only important to evaluate the available
information but also to recognize what information remains
unknown. By understanding what information remains unknown,
a person may choose to take specific actions to obtain the
evidence required to eliminate this ignorance.
To properly describe the decision making process, it is
imperative to understand the difference between a partial
belief and total ignorance. Ignorance is characterized as a
situation where none of the relevant information required to
support a decision is available. In other words, there is
no supporting evidence present that will bias a choice
between any of the alternative solutions. On the other
hand, a situation representing partial belief exists when
not all the information required to make a completely
certain decision is available, though a subset of the
necessary information is available. Based on this subset of
information, a person will not be able to make a certain
choice between alternative solutions. She will, however, be
able to limit the number of alternatives that are feasible.
This difference between ignorance and partial belief will be
discussed further as it relates to the formalisms described
in the following chapters.
Chapter Three
Probability Theory
Probability theory has played an active role in
decision making in AI and expert systems for over 10 years
[Nutter, 1987]. At the same time, the role of probability
theory in reasoning with uncertainty continues to be a
widely debated subject. A fact in favor of probability
theory is that it provides a proven mathematical formalism
for dealing with uncertainty. The opponents to probability,
however, are quick to point out that the requirement for
numbers or evidence that is not generally available is a
severe shortcoming. At the same time, the evidence that is
available is often discounted on the basis that it is
subjective. A source of contention with Bayesian Theory is
the strong independence assumptions required in order to
make this theory computationally feasible. It is also
argued [Zadeh, 1986] that the inadequacy of probability




3.1 Background : What are probabilities?
Numerical probability theory has been interpreted in
many different ways. Each of these different
10
interpretations or theories has produced its own specific
* language'
to be used to express probability judgement
[Shafer, 1986].
Traditionally, probabilities have been defined in terms
of frequency ratios. A set of all possible hypotheses or
outcomes, generally known as the sample space, is defined
first. Each element in the sample space is assigned a
weight ranging from zero to one. This weight defines the
likelihood of the occurrence of the element resulting from a
statistical experiment. That is to say, given a
sufficiently large number of samples or tests, the
likelihood of an element (A) is defined as the proportion of
the number of outcomes that correspond to element (A) to
that of all elements that fall in this set. A weight of
zero represents that the given hypothesis is false, whereas
a weight of one represents that it is true. An event is
defined as a subset of the sample space. The probability of
an event (E) is then defined as the sum of all the weights
assigned to elements in E.
In AI, the frequency interpretation of probability has
limited application. First of all, the amount of data
required to derive a probability would not be available in
most cases. Secondly, the data that is available is often
very subjective with no strong statistical foundation. It
should be noted, however, that in areas that are well
studied and for which large amounts of statistical data are
available, this approach offers a good method for reasoning.
In AI, due to the nature of the majority of domains,
11
large amounts of statistical data is generally unavailable.
As a result of these data limitations, the Bayesian approach
has adopted the definition of a probability as a subjective
measure of belief. In this approach, the probability of an
event, given certain evidence, is a subjective measure of
the degree a person believes the event will occur. The
chance'
that an event will occur is attached directly to
the event.
A generalization of the Bayesian Theory is the theory
of belief functions or the Dempster-Shafer Theory. In this
theory, the probability is a subjective measure of belief as
in the Bayesian Theory. The Dempster-Shafer Theory differs
from the Bayesian approach in that the belief is the measure
of the degree a person believes that the evidence proves the
hypothesis to be true, not whether the hypothesis itself is
true. The * chance' is attached to whether the evidence
supports the hypothesis.
Mycin certainty factors were developed as an early
model for inexact reasoning for use in medical diagnosis.
In Mycin, the probability is a subjective measure of a
physician's belief that a hypothesis is supported by a given
observation. The theoretical basis for certainty factors is
in the interpretation of probability known as confirmation
[Shortliffe, 1976]. Confirmation of a hypothesis does not
indicate that a hypothesis is true or proven, it merely
indicates that there is evidence to support the hypothesis.
As in the Dempster-Shafer Theory, the
x chance' is attached
12
to whether the evidence supports the hypothesis.
All three of these approaches use the standard calculus
of probability- Their differences lie in the fact that they
apply this calculus in different ways. The next section will
present the Bayesian Theory of Probability in considerable
detail paying particular attention to the features and
assumptions that are presently subject to much debate. In
section 3.3, the model of inexact reasoning implemented in
the expert system, Mycin, will be presented. The
Dempster-
Shafer theory will be discussed further in section 3.4.
13
3.2 Bayesian Probability Theory
The Bayesian Theory of probability is based on the work
of Thomas Bayes (1702 - 1761) [Shafer, 1986]. In this
approach, a probability is a subjective measure of
certainty. The probability that hypothesis (H) will occur
represents the degree to which a person believes it will
occur, given the current evidence. The
* chance'
that a
specific hypothesis is true or false is represented by a
probability value in the range of [0,1J. A hypothesis
assigned a probability of one is believed to be totally
true, whereas a probability value of zero would imply
absolutely false. All alternative hypotheses in a given
sample space are assigned probability values such that their
sum would be one.
Many early expert systems used Bayesian Theory as a
foundation for their designs for dealing with uncertainty
and this approach does, in fact, provide a good mathematical
formalism for dealing with uncertainty [Clancy,Shortliffe,
1984], Unfortunately, due to several inherent limitations
of Bayes Theorem, these early systems were not implemented
with true Bayesian mechanisms but instead with ad hoc
schemes using heurisitic methods. A discussion of the
mathematical model of the Bayesian Theory will be presented
in the following sections and the assumptions and inherent
14
limitations of this model will be highlighted.
3.2.1 Conditional Probabilities
Bayesian probability is based on the idea of
conditional probabilities, which are useful in situations
where the information concerning an event is incomplete or
otherwise uncertain. A conditional probability is the
probability of a hypothesis (H) occurring based on the fact
that event (E) has already occurred. More formally, a
conditional probability is represented as:
P(H|E) = N
which is read as the probability of hypothesis (H) given
event (E) . The probability is set to a value (N) between
zero and one, which represents our belief that the
hypothesis is true. Consider the following example.
P(It is raining | It is lightning)
This represents the likelihood that it is raining given the
fact that we know that it is lightning. If it was our
belief that it always rains when there is lightning, we
would set P(It is raining | It is lightning) to one.
An unconditional probability, in contrast, is the
probability of an hypothesis before any other information or
evidence is known. In discussions of Bayesian Theory these
are most often referred to as prior probabilities, because
they are set prior to any evidence. A prior probability is
15
represented as P(H) = N, where N is a number between zero
and one representing the degree of belief that a hypothesis
is true before any other information is known.
In order to build a formal definition of conditional
probabilities, let us return to the idea of frequency ratios
[Lukacs, 1972]. Given a statistical experiment where n
trials were made and events (X) and (Y) were observed. The
relative frequency of event (X) is:
RF(X) = Nx / n ( 3.1 )
where N represents the number of observations of event (X) .
Likewise, the relative frequency of the event (XHY)
representing that both events were observed is
RF(XOY) = Nxny /n (
3.2 )
What we are really interested in is the relative frequency
of event Y given event X. In other words, we need to know
the number of outcomes that correspond to event (Y) with
respect to a reduced sample space. This reduced sample
space is composed of all hypotheses from the original set in
which event (X) is true. The relative frequency of Y given
X is represented as
RF(Y|X) = **xny__
Nx
by substitution from 3.1 and 3.2 we get
RF(Y|X) = RFfXOY) ( 3.3 )
RF(X)
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Given that the number of trials of the experiment is large,
eguation 3.3 suggests the following definition.
Let (.Q.,S,P) be a probability space and X and Y be two
events. Suppose P(X) > 0 then :
P(Y|X) = P(XQY) ( 3.4 )
P(X)
is called the conditional probability of Y given event X has
occured. Now let X and Y be two events and suppose that
P(X) > 0 and P(Y) > 0. From 3.4 we see that
P(XHY) = P(X) P(Y|X)
P(XOY) = P(Y) P(X|Y)
By eliminating P(Xf)Y) we obtain
P(Y|X) = Pm PfX|Y)
P(X) ( 3.5 )
3.2.2 Bayes
' Theorem
Bayes' Theorem specifies a way that conditional
probabilities can be calculated. From equation 3.5 we see
that
P(H|E) = P(H) PfElHl (
3.6 )
P(E)
Where P(H) and P(E) represent prior
probabilites that
hypothesis (H) or event (E) occur,
respectively. P(E|H)
represents the conditional probability of the event (E)
17
given hypothesis (H) . The left side of the eguation
represents the posterior probability that (H) occurs after
the evidence is known. Equation 3 . 6 is generally known as
Bayes'
formula. Bayes' Theorem can be derived from this
formula by applying the total probability rule to the
denominator. The Total Probability Rule states:
Let A be a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
events, let B be an arbitrary event,
P(B)"
= ^P(Aj) P(B|Aj)
Therefore, applying this rule to equation 3.6 we arrive at
Bayes'
Theorem:
Assume a set of mutually exclusive and mutually
exhaustive events or hypotheses (H) in sample space (S) ,
PfHjjE) = P(Hi) PCElHi)
^PCHi) P(E|Hi)
The Total Probability rule introduces the requirement
that all hypotheses in the sample space are mutually
exclusive. This means that at any given time only one
hypothesis in the sample space can occur. As a basis for
the remainder of our discussion,
Bayes' formula ( Equation
3.5 ) will be used.
Most decision making environments
are not generally
characterized by a single piece of evidence. Instead,
decisions are made based on a collection of
information and
evidence. As new information is gathered, beliefs must
be
18
revised to relect this new evidence. Bayes' formula can be
extended to accomodate multiple pieces of evidence as
follows:
P(H|Ei...En) = P(H) (Ei..^!!)
P(Ei...En) ( 3.7 )
Unfortunately as the amount of evidence increases, the
number of probabilities required also increases, making this
solution computationally impractical. One way to simplify
the above equation to a more workable form is to apply the
concept of statistical independence.
3.2.3 Statistical Independence Assumptions
The preceding sections have been concerned primarily
with probabilities of events based on the occurrence of
other events or conditional probabilities. Conditional
probabilities are useful in describing situations where
evidence has a direct affect on our belief that another
situation or hypothesis is either true or false. At the
other extreme, however, we need to characterize a situation
where the occurrence of an event has no bearing on our
belief in a particular hypothesis. In this case, event (E)
and hypothesis (H) are totally independent.
If it is thought that events X and Y are independent of
each other, it follows that the probability of Y given
event





By substituting this into equation 3.4 we see that two
events are independent if:
P(XOY) = P(X) P(Y)
This can be extended to include all relevant events:
P^O.^) = V(XL)... P(Xn) ( 3.8 )
This describes events that are independent of each other in
relation to the world. In order to incorporate the idea of
conditional probabilities, equation 3.8 can be extended
further to describe events that are independent in relation
to a subset of the world in which a particular hypothesis is
true. This can be represented as follows:
P(X & Y|H) = P(X|H) P(Y|H)
By adopting these independence assumptions,
Bayes' formula
can be written as:
PfHiE! & E2)
= P(H) PfE-jH) P(E2|H)
PfE^ P(E2) ( 3.9 )
In this form, the probabilities required are reduced to
those required in the case of one event [Charniak, 1984].
As new evidence is gathered, the hypothesis must be re
evaluated based on the new evidence. From 3.9, it is
apparent that as new evidence is received the probability of
the hypothesis can be updated easily.
20
3.2.4 Ignorance
The Bayesian Probability Theory does not offer a way to
explicitly represent total ignorance. In order to simulate
the total lack of knowledge, the maximum entropy assumption
is used. The maximum entropy assumption assumes that all
events are independent and then distributes the uncertainty
as evenly as possible over all events [Cheeseman, 1985] . As
a result each event is assigned a probability value
representing the least amount of commitment. For example,
in the case of two independent events A and B the




This sets up a neutral background that any new changes can
then be compared against. The validity of these assumptions
will be further discussed in section 3.5.3.
21
3.3 MYCIN - An Early Expert System
Mycin medical diagnosis system was developed as part of
the Stanford Heuristic Programming Project by Edward
Shortliffe and in collaboration with the Infectious Disease
Group at Stanford Medical School in 1974 [Michie, 1982].
Mycin was developed to aid physicians in the diagnosis and
treatment of meningitis and blood infections. One of the
key challenges faced in Mycin was how to account for the
uncertainty that is inherent in clinical decision making.
[Buchanan,Shortliffe, 1984].
Mycin is based on an interactive dialogue with a
physician, during which the physician is asked a number of
questions concerning the condition of their patient. A
backward chaining inference method is then used to backtrack
through an and/or tree to determine the disease and the
appropriate treatment. The benefit of backward chaing is
that the groups of questions asked by the system are focused
towards a particular hypothesis [Michie, 1982]. This was a
critical feature attributing to the acceptance of Mycin by
the physicians.
To handle the uncertainty involved in medical
diagnosis, Shortliffe and Buchanan developed and implemented
a reasoning model in Mycin
which allows a physician to
express varying degrees of
belief in facts and hypotheses.
This degree of belief is characterized as a probabilistic
22
weight called a certainty factor. During an interactive
session with Mycin, a physician could express his degree of
certainty of an event by entering a number between 1 and 10
which would then be automatically converted to probability
values [Shortliffe, 1976].
Their goal in developing this reasoning model was to
avoid strict Bayesian probability and its inherent
assumptions and restrictions. It has been shown, however,
that a substantial part of this model can be derived from
probability theory and in some cases is equivalent [Adams,
1984], The definition and formal notation of certainty
factors and the functions used to combine them will be
presented in the following sections.
3.3.1 Mycin's Certainty Factors
Mycin certainty factors are based on two
independent
units of measure: belief and disbelief. The formal
representation of belief is
MB[h,e]
= x
which is read as the measure of increased belief in the
hypothesis, h, given the evidence, e, is equal
to x.




representing the measure of
increased disbelief in the
hypothesis, h, given the evidence, e.
The requirement for
two separate and independent measures is due to
an
interpretation of confirmation theory stating that C[h,e]
=
23
1 - C[not h,e] [Shortliffe, 1976]. Simply, this states that
a piece of evidence that supports a particular hypothesis
does not necessarily affect the support of the negation of
that hypothesis. In support of this, many experts have
expressed that though they believe in a hypothesis to a
particular degree, x, they are uncomfortable stating that
they believe in the negation of the hypothesis to a degree,
1-x. Even though some of the restrictions inherent in
probability theory can be avoided by using two independent
measures of belief, certainty factors retain a strong
foundation in Bayesian probability theory.
These measures of belief (MB) and disbelief (MD) can be
represented in terms of Bayesian probability as follows:
MB[h,e] = Pfh|e)
- Pfh)
1 - P(h) ( 3.9 )
MD[h,e] = P(h)
- P(h|e)
P(h) ( 3.10 )
where P(h) represents the subjective belief in the
hypothesis prior to any evidence and P(h|e) represents the
conditional probability given the known evidence. In
subjective probability theory, all alternative hypotheses
must be assigned beliefs that sum to one. Therefore, l-P(h)
represents the disbelief in the hypothesis, h, and equation
3.9 represents the proportionate decrease in disbelief given
the evidence [Buchanan,Shortliffe, 1984], If a piece of
24
evidence increases our belief in the hypothesis, P(h|e) will
be greater than P(h) and the value of MB will increase
representing the growth of our belief. On the other hand,
if a piece of evidence decreases our belief in a hypothesis,
P(h|e) would be less than P(h) and the value of MD would
increase representing our increased disbelief.
The certainty factor combines these two independent





Substituting the probability ratios, equations 3.9 and 3.10,
into this formula shows that both the prior probability,
P(h) , and the conditional probablity, P(h|e), are combined
into the single measure of CF[h,e]. Because of this, it has
been suggested that the certainty factor may be a more
naturally intuitive term for an expert to express
[Buchanan, Shortliffe, 1984], The reasoning model
implemented in Mycin assumes that the values of MB and MD
received from the expert are adequate estimates of the
values that would be calculated if the necessary
probabilities were known.
In Mycin, certainty factors are applied to both rules
and facts that contain some level of uncertainty. By
definition, MB and MD are restricted to values in the range
of [0,1]. Therefore, CF is limited to values in the range
of [-1,1] There are a number of
special cases that define
25
the properties of these measures. In the case where MB[h,e]
= 1 and MD[h,e] = 0, the expert is absolutely certain of the
hypothesis and CF[h,e] = 1. On the other hand, when MB[h,e]
= 0 and MD[h,e] = 1, CF[h,e] = -1 representing absolute
disbelief in the hypothesis or absolute certainty in the
negation of the hypothesis. In the situation where MB[h,e]
=
MD[h,e] = 1, there is conflicting or contradictory
evidence and CF[h,e] is undefined.
3.3.2 Combining Evidence in Mycin
Our belief in a hypothesis or conclusion is usually
based on numerous pieces of information. In Mycin, as new
evidence is obtained the values of MB and MD are adjusted to
reflect the joint effect of all the evidence on our belief.
It is important to remember that since MB and MD are
independent measures, the combination of favoring and
disfavoring evidence is done independently -
The following functions define how incrementally
acquired evidence is combined in Mycin. It is important to
point out that an underlying assumption of these functions
is that of independence. That is to say, it is assumed that
all the evidence is independent from each other [Adams,
1984] . As new evidence is obtained that increases our






In the case that MDfhjSj^ & s2]
= 1, by definition MB will
26
equal 0. On the other hand, to reflect disfavoring
evidence, MD will be adjusted as follows:
MD^s-l &.s2]
= MD[h,s1] + MD[h,s2](l
-
MD[h,s1])
Simply stated, as new evidence is acquired the values of MB
and MD are increased proportionally to the belief or
disbelief already present.
In Mycin, functions were also defined to allow the
description of our belief or disbelief in multiple
hypotheses given a particular fact or observation.




operations. Our belief and disbelief in the conjunction of
two different hypotheses are defined as follows:
MBth-L & h2, e]
= min (MB[h1,e], MB[h2,e])
MDth-L & h2, e]
= max (MD[h1#e], MD[h2,e])
Our belief and disbelief in the disjunction or the boolean
or'
of two hypotheses are represented by the following
equations.
MB[h1 or h2, e]
= max (MBCh^e], MB[h2,e])
MD[hx or h2, e]
= min (MD[hlfe], MD[h2,e])
In viewing these functions, there are some underlying
assumptions concerning the relationship of the
hypotheses.
For example, consider the case where hypothesis, hi, and h2
are mutually exclusive. In this case, the
conjunction of
the hypotheses would equal zero regardless of our belief in
either hypothesis. The disjunction of the hypotheses, on
27
the other hand, would be equal to a number larger than our
belief in either hypothesis separately [Adams, 1984].
In our decision making, uncertainty is not only
apparent in our beliefs of a particular hypothesis but also
in our beliefs of evidence or observations. In order to
account for this, certainty factors are applied to both
facts and rules in Mycin. To insure that our actual belief
in the supporting evidence is properly reflected in the
measure of our belief or disbelief of the hypothesis,
Shortliffe and Buchanan defined the following functions
which incorporate the actual strength of the evidence.
MB[h,s] = MB'[h,s] * max ( 0, CF[s,e] )
MD[h,s] = MD'[h,s] * max ( 0, CF[s,e] )
In these functions MB'[h,s] and MD'[h,s] represent the
measure of belief and disbelief in the hypothesis, h, given
that we are totally certain of the given evidence, s. In
Mycin, these represent the decision rules that are acquired
from the experts [Buchanan, Shortliffe, 1984]. CF[s,e]
represents the certainty factor describing our actual belief
in the evidence, s, based on the prior evidence, e.
The
examples in the following sections will illustrate how these
functions are actually used in Mycin.
3.3.3 Certainty Factors
- Examples
Below is an example of an actual decision rule that
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could be found in the expert system Mycin [Waterman, 1986] .
IF 1) The strain of the organism is grampos, and
2) The morphology of the organism is coccus, and
3) The growth conformation of the organism is chains
THEN
There is suggestive evidence (0.7) that the identity of
the organism is streptococcos .
In more generic terms, this rule takes the form of
IF X & Y & Z
THEN H with certainty of 0.7.
In mathematical notation this rule would be represented as
CF[h,x & y & z]
= 0.7
As decision rules are acquired from experts, certainty
factors are assigned to these rules based on the absolute
belief in the truth of the supporting evidence. In this
example, our expert has expressed a relatively high level of
belief that the hypothesis is true given that the three
underlying facts are known to be certain. Therefore, a
certainty factor of 0.7 has been assigned to this rule.
Consider now, that the expert's actual belief in the
supporting evidence is represented by the following
certainty factors.
X with certainty 0.5
Y with certainty 0.7
Z with certainty 0.3
Our experts prior belief in the hypothesis is given as
CF'[h,x & y & z]
= 0.7.
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By applying the functions defined in section 3.3.2 to
incorporate the actual strength of evidence, we can
calculate the experts actual belief in the hypothesis.
CF[h,x & y & z]
= CF'[h,x & y & z]
*
max(0, CF[x & y & z])
CF[h,x & y & z]
= 0.7 * max( 0, CF[x & y & z])
Now by applying the functions describing the conjunction of
hypotheses we arrive at
CF[h,x & y & z]
= 0.7 * max ( 0,min(0. 5, 0. 7 , 0. 3) )
CF[h,x & y & z]
= 0.7 * 0.3
CF[h,x & y & z]
= 0.21
The expert expressed a relatively low level of certainty of
the supporting evidence and consequently the value of
certainty assigned to the hypothesis has been adjusted
downward. It is worth noting that if an expert has no
knowledge concerning the truth or falsity of a piece of
evidence he would assign a value of zero certainty to the
evidence. Missing information is simply disregarded from
the rule. For example , MBth^ & s2]
=
MBthfS-J in the
case that the information concerning s2
is missing.
It is also possible that a given hypothesis is the
result of several different decision rules. In this case,
as new evidence is obtained to substantiate rules, the
actual belief in the hypothesis must be recalculated as a
combination of all the relevant rules. For example,
consider these two rules:
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RULE 1 : IF X & Y
THEN H with certainty 0.6
EVIDENCE: X with certainty 0.5
Y with certainty 0.7
RULE 2 : IF Z
THEN H with certainty 0.8
EVIDENCE: Z with certainty 0.5
First we must calculate the actual belief in the hypothesis
for each rule based on the present belief in the supporting
evidence.
RULE 1: CF[H, X & Y] = 0.6 * max ( 0,min(0. 5, 0. 7) )
CF[H, X & Y] = 0.3
RULE 2: CF[H,Z] = 0.8 * max ( 0,0.5)
CF[H,Z] = 0.4
The certainty factors from both rules must now be combined
by applying equation 3.11.
CF[H,(X & Y) & Z] = CF[H,X & Y] + CF[H,Z]( 1
- CF(H,X & Y] )
CF[H,(X & Y) & Z] = 0.3 + 0.4(0.7)
CF[H, (X & Y) & Z] = 0.58
3.3.4 Ignorance
Mycin certainty factors do not offer an
unambiguous
representation of ignorance or total lack of knowledge. In
the event that an expert has no evidence or knowledge
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concerning a particular hypothesis, h, his belief and
disbelief would be equal to 0. In this case, CF[h,e]=0
would indicate that the evidence is independent of the
hypothesis and neither confirms or disconfirms it
[Shortliffe, 1984].
Unfortunately, a certainty factor of zero may also
arise due to equal non-zero values of MB and MD. In this
case, the evidence that has been observed both confirms and
disconfirms the hypothesis by equal amounts resulting in a
net belief of zero.
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3.4 Dempster-Shafer Mathematical Theory of Evidence
The Dempster-Shafer Mathematical Theory of evidence was
first developed by Arthur Dempster in the 1960 's. Glenn
Shafer further extended the theory and published "A
Mathematical Theory of
Evidence" in 1976. The Dempster-
Shafer Theory uses the same standard calculus of probability
as the Bayesian Theory, although it applies this calculus in
a much different way. The Dempster-Shafer Theory deals with
weights of evidence and numerical degrees of support based
on evidence rather than on Bayesian probabilities.
This theory has several characteristics that make it an
attractive approach to approximate reasoning. First of all,
the Dempster-Shafer theory has the ability to narrow the
hypothesis set with the accumulation of evidence. This can
be achieved because the evidence accumulated by the expert
does not bear on a single hypothesis in the hypothesis set
but instead bears on a larger subset of this set. The
actual order in which evidence is gathered will not affect
the solution. This theory allows an explicit distinction
between lack of knowledge and certainty.
3.4.1 Representation of Uncertain Information
The representation of evidence in the Dempster-Shafer
Theory begins with the frame of discernment ( e ) [Shafer,
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1976] . The frame of discernment is the set of all possible
hypotheses or events in a domain. All possibilities in a
given frame of discernment are mutually exclusive and
exhaustive. The set of hypotheses or events to which belief
can be assigned is represented by
2e
, corresponding to all
possible subsets of 0. Figure 3.4.1 represents the set of
all possible subsets over the frame of discernment -
[Spruce, Fir, Pine],
Given a piece of evidence, the Dempster-Shafer theory
indicates a belief in the evidence by assigning a number in
the range of [0,1]. A numerical function used to represent
our exact belief in a proposition is defined as the basic
probability assignment. The basic probability assignment is
defined as follows:
If 8 is a frame of discernment, then the function




2) m(0) = 1
This implies that no belief ought to be committed to the
empty set and one's total belief is equal
to one. Each
subset of 0 is assigned a value of m such that all the
numbers will sum to 1. The probability assignment m(A) ,
represents the belief committed exactly to the proposition
A. This belief cannot be subdivided by the subsets of A; it
represents only the belief
committed to A alone.
The total belief that is committed to a hypothesis is
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[ Pine, Spruce, Fir ] ( e )
[ Pine, Spruce ] [ Pine, Fir ] [ Spruce, Fir ]
[ Pine ] [ Fir ]





represented by the belief function. The total belief in a
given hypothesis (A) is the sum of all the exact beliefs in
the hypotheses that imply A and the exact belief in A
itself.
BEL(A) = ^_^ m(B)
BCA
To obtain the total belief in the hypothesis A, one must add
to m(A) the quantities m(B) for all proper subsets B of A.
The basic probability assignment can then be recovered
from the belief function:
. r ,-,m(A) = </ . (-1)IA-BI Bel(B)
BCA
for all AC0
It follows that for a given belief function there is only
one basic probability assignment, and that for a given
probability assignment there is only one belief function.
Therefore, the same information is being conveyed by the
belief function and the basic probability function.
Corresponding to belief functions, there are three
other functions that are useful in characterizing evidence.
The Doubt function expresses the degree to which the
evidence refutes a hypothesis A. The Doubt function is
represented as follows:
DOU(A) = BEL (A)
Our doubt of A is equal to our belief in the negation of A.
The Plausibility function, on the other hand,
expresses
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the extent of which one fails to doubt or refute the
hypothesis A. This function is expresses as follows:
PL(A) = 1 - BEL(A)
PL (A) = 1 - DOU(A)
PL(A) , also called the upper probability function, expresses
the extent to which one finds the hypothesis plausible. In
terms of the basic probability assignments, the plausibility
function can be stated as follows:
<C^ m(B)
- /_^P1(A) = m(B)
BCe BCA
PI (A) = S\ m(B)
BOA <p
Another function that is useful when dealing with
belief functions is the commonality function. The





The commonality Q(A) , is equal to the sum of all subsets
that have A as their subset. It is interesting to note that
Q(tf) = 1-








assignment now can be recovered. The plausibility and
commonality functions are also related as follows:
= 2_ (-1)IBI+1PL(A) <__ (-1) | | Q(B)
BCA
Therefore, it follows that the belief, plausibility,
commonality and basic probability assignment are in one to
one correspondence and represent the same information.
For each body of evidence, these functions define an
"evidential interval" [Garvey , Lowrance ,Wesley, 1984] within
which our belief about a hypothesis must lie. The belief
function represents the lower bound of this interval, and
the plausibility function represents the upper bound. When
our knowledge of a hypothesis (A) is certain and precise,
the BEL (A) and PL (A) are equal to one. In this special
case, this theory reduces to general Bayesian probability.
3.4.2 Belief, Commonality and Plausibility
- An Example
In an attempt to clarify the definitions in the previous
section, consider again the scenario in Figure 3.4.1. Based
on evidence that is gathered, the variable (X) could take on
one of three values: Spruce, Pine or Fir. The number of
subsets to which we will assign belief is represented by 2e.
Based on the available evidence, we assign a basic
probability assignment to all members of 6, such that they
sum to one. The probability assignments for each
set are
shown in Figure 3.4.2. Figure 3.4.2 also shows the
calculated values for the belief, plausibility and
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Set m Bel PI
Pine 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.8
Spruce 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4
Fir 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5
Pine, Spruce 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.3
Pine, Fir 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.4
Spruce, Fir 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.1
Pine, Spruce, Fir 0.1 1.0 1.0 0.1
t 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.0
Calculations for the belief, plausibility, and commonality
for a given body of evidence pertaining to the
subsets of
the set of coniferous trees.
Figure 3.4.2
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commonality functions, based on these probability
assignments. As shown, their is no direct evidence for
[Spruce, Fir] though the belief function is greater than
zero. This is due to the non-zero values for the basic
probability assignments (m) pertaining to the subsets
[Spruce] and [Fir].
The plausibility of a given set is represented by the
summation of the probability assignments for all sets that
do intersect with that set. In the case of the set
[Spruce, Fir] , all sets with the exception of [Pine]
intersect with it. Therefore, the Plausibility value is
equal to 0.8.
Commonality of the set [Spruce, Fir] is equal to the sum
of the probability assignments for all sets that have
[Spruce,Fir] as a subset. In this case, the only values to
be summed are those for [Spruce, Fir] and [Spruce, Fir, Pine] .
The resulting value for Q is 0.1.
3.4.3 Combining Evidence from Multiple Sources
In order to accomodate information obtained from
multiple sources, Dempster-Shafer has developed a method
that provides the facility for the combination of evidence.
There are generally two scenarios
where evidence must be
combined. The first scenario is when two or more facts in a
given body of evidence need to be combined
to obtain their
joint effect, and the second scenario
is when two entirely
different bodies of evidence need to be combined. Given a
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specified &, and a given body of evidence, we have already
shown how to combine elementary facts. We will now
concentrate on combining evidence that supports or negates a
hypothesis from two totally different bodies of evidence.
The Dempster-Shafer model provides a formal mechanism to
combine different bodies of evidence.
Given two belief functions based on two pieces of
evidence, Dempster's Rule of Combination computes a new
belief function that represents the impact of the combined
evidence. The belief function to be combined must be over
the same frame of discernment. The order in which evidence
is combined is not important since the combination rule is
both commutative and associative. Let ml and m2 be basic
probability assignments on the same frame of discernment 6.
Let m = ml <8 m2
, defining their orthogonal sum. The new
probability assignment, as a result of combining ml and m2 ,
is defined as:
m(A)
= k (A- ml(X) * m2(Y))
XHY = A
Where X and Y are all subsets whose intersection is A. m(A)
is the new basic probability assignment as a result of
combining ml and m2.
In order to intuitively understand this combination
rule, it can be represented in a
geometric model [Barnett,
1981]. Let the basic probability assignments for
each body
of evidence be depicted as portions of a line
segment of
length one. Now Consider a unit square with
two sides, one
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side representing ml and the other side representing m2 .
Figure 3.4.3 shows the two line segments ml and m2
orthogonally combined to from a square. The intersection of
a vertical strip ml (A) and a horizontal strip m2 (A) results
in mass ml(Aj)
*
m2(Aj) associated with the combination of
AOB. There may be more than one rectangle in the square
committed for a particular subset; therefore, we must sum
all values.
For rectangles where there is no intersection, aob = <f ,
a committment is made to the empty set. Dempster states,
however, that m($)
= 0. The assigned values are therefore,
normalized so the ml m2 (^) =0, and all new values are
between 0 and 1. This is accomplished by setting ml e m2
(6) =0 and multiplying each other
value by K, where K is
equal to l/(l-k). The value of k is defined as the
sum of
all non-zero values assigned to the empty set.
The weight
of conflict between two sources is defined
as log(K) .
3.4.4 Dempster's Rule of Combination
- An Example
Let us look at some examples of
Dempster's rule of
combination. First consider a particularly interesting
example due to Zadeh (Figure
3.4.4). There are two sources
of evidence, ml and m2.
Ml shows a large amount of
certainty in the possibility
of hypothesis a and also
in the
impossibility of hypothesis c. M2,
on the other hand, is
very certain in the possibility
of hypothesis c and
the
impossibility of hypothesis













Set ml m2 ml + m2 (ml + m2)/(l-k)
a 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
b 0.1 0.1 0.01 1.0











log(K) = log(l / (1-k))




b as the only possible answer even though both ml and m2
considered it to be highly improbable which is shown by the
probability assignment of 0.1. Shafer has provided an
answer for this rather counter-intuitive result. Each
source has distributed the entire unit weight among the
hypothesis a,b,and c, which implies that the source is
entirely reliable. In other words, neither source has any
degree of uncertainty or ignorance. Due to the large
discrepency between the beliefs of the two sources, it
seems that the reliability of each source is slightly
questionable. If the sources are not considered to be fully
reliable, the result is not so unexpected. It is
interesting to note that the resultant probability
assignments do not reflect the conflict seen in the
probability of the sources.
Another interesting example of Dempster's rule for
combination is shown in Figure 3.4.5. Again there are two
sources of evidence ml and m2 . Both sources have committed
the same amount of belief to hypotheses a, b and c
respectively. This can be seen in that the two sources have
identical probability assignments for each hypothesis. The
result shows that the dominant hypothesis c, is reinforced.
This shows that the rule of combination reinforces the
agreements between sources and discards the conflicts. This
example implies that as more evidence is collected, we can
narrow in on a particular hypothesis.
Figure 3.4.6 illustrates a combination of beliefs over





Set ml m2 ml + m2 (ml + m2)/(l-k)
a 0.3 0.3 0.09 0.26
b 0.3 0.3 0.09 0.26








0.09 a 0.09 f 0.12 <f
0.09 <ji 0.09 b 0.12 <f
0.12 <f 0.12 ^ 0.16 c




log(K) = log(l / (1-k))







Set ml m2 ml + m2 (ml + m2)/(l-k)
Pine (P) 0.2 0.0 0.17 0.24
Spruce (S) 0.1 0.3 0.22 0.315
Fir (F) 0.1 0.1 0.14 0.20
Pine, Spruce (PS) 0.2 0.3 0.11 0.16
Pine, Fir (PF) 0.3 0.0 0.03 0.04
Spruce, Fir (SF) 0.0 0.2 0.02 0.03
Pine, Spruce, Fir 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.015
(PSF)
(m2)




( . 2 ) PS
( . 3 ) PF
(.0)SF
(.1)PSF
0 .06 t .02 9I .06 P 0 .04 *S .02 P







.03 (fl 0 .02 F .01 F
0 .06 PS 0 .04 S .02 PS
0 .09 f .03 F .09 P 0 .06 F .03 PF
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 .03 s .01 F .03 PS 0 .02 SF .01 PSF
k = ^ ml(X) * m2(Y)
= 0.3
log(K) = log(l / (1-k))




completes our discussion of the coniferous tree example.
3.4.5 Ignorance
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence allows for an
explicit distinction between a total lack of knowledge or
ignorance and a high level of disbelief. When a person is
ignorant concerning a hypothesis, he has no belief either in
the hypothesis or in its negation. In terms of the
Dempster-Shafer Theory ignorance is defined as follows:
Ignorance = PL (A)
- BEL (A)
Consider the case of determining the sex of a person.
The frame of discernment consists of male and female:
9 = [Male, Female]
The set of all possible subsets is
2"
= [0,^,Male, Female]
Bel (Male) represents the degree of belief that the person is
male and likewise Bel (Female) represents the belief that the
person is female. In the case, that very little evidence
was available that specifically supported the belief that
the person was either male of female, m(Male) and m(Female)
would be set very low. It would follow that
Bel (Male) and
Bel (Female) also would be very low. In the case that no
evidence at all was available, Bel (Male) and Bel (Female)
would be zero and the Bel (9) would be one. This situation,
called the vacuous belief function, represents total
ignorance. Generally stated, the




= 1, m(A) = 0, for all A f 0
Bel(O) = 1, Bel (A) = 0, for all A 4 0
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3.5 Comparison of Bayesian, Mycin and Dempster-Shafer Approaches
In an attempt to describe rational decision making, all
three of these approaches to uncertainty provide a
mathematical formalism primarily based in probability
theory. A
x rational'
decision is defined as a decision that
abides by the requirements and limitations of the
underlying functions and data structures that define each
specific theory. People, however, do not always approach
decision making in a truly rational manner. An
x actual'
decision is more of a psychological concept that describes
how people truly make decisions in situations of uncertainty
[Carnap, 1971] . All three of these theories require the
expert to adhere to their specific functional requirements
therefore maintaining a rational approach to problem
solving. However, the actual level of restriction imposed
by these requirements varies among the three
approaches.
The Dempster-Shafer theory, by offering a more naturally
intuitive way to express uncertainty,
appears to be the
least restrictive.
3.5.1 Representation of Belief
In the Bayesian probability theory, all
alternative
hypotheses are assigned probability
values so that they sum
to one. The expert is forced to
divide his belief among
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each individual hypothesis in the sample space. This is a
relatively easy task when we are sure of our beliefs in all
of the propositions. m the case that we are not confident
of our belief in a proposition, however, we might find it
very difficult or uncomfortable to assign a number to our
belief. In the event that an expert is either doubtful of
his belief or in fact ignorant concerning a given
hypothesis, he is still required to assign a probability
value to the hypothesis when using the Bayesian approach.
This often leads to an overcommittment of his actual belief.
In Mycin, this restriction is avoided by independently
measuring belief and disbelief. In this case, the expert is
no longer forced to assign probabilities to all alternative
hypotheses regardless of his confidence in his belief.
However, the expert is restricted to assigning point
probabilities to individual hypothesis so that the upper
limit of their sum is one.
In the situation where our knowledge is incomplete,
the Dempster-Shafer theory offers a good alternative
approach. In the Dempster-Shafer theory, belief is assigned
to all possible subsets of the hypothesis space or the frame
of discernment so that the total belief will sum to one.
This provides the expert more alternative ways to express
his beliefs, no longer restricting him to supporting only
individual hypotheses. In this approach, the expert is no
longer forced to commit to a belief that he is not confident
in, therefore providing a better representation of his true
beliefs. This advantage of the Dempster-Shafer theory is
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most evident in the case of total ignorance.
3.5.2 Ignorance
Ignorance is characterized as a situation where there
is no relevant information or knowledge available to support
a decision. In this case, the Dempster-Shafer surpasses
both Bayesian probability and Mycin by offering a way to
explicitly represent ignorance. In the Dempster-Shafer
approach, as described in section 3.4.5, when a person is
ignorant concerning a hypothesis he can assign all his
belief to the frame of discernment (9) which represents the
entire set of possible hypotheses. He is not forced to
assign his belief to any individual hypothesis, therefore
allowing a more comfortable and natural way to express his
lack of knowledge without overcommitting his belief.
In Bayesian probability, Cheeseman argues that by
applying the maximum entropy assumptions a
neutral
background is established representing the least amount of
committment. Opponents argue that this assumes more than is
truly known by assuming that all
events are independent.
Though this argument is justified, statistical independence
is an assumption found in all three approaches and is further
discussed in section 3.5.4. Even though theoretically,
maximum entropy represents
the least amount of committment,
it does not offer the expert a clear
and unambiguous way to
express his lack of knowledge. A
person is still required
to assign a point probability
to individual hypotheses,
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therefore forcing a statement of belief that exceeds his
actual belief.
In Mycin, ignorance is represented by assigning a
certainty factor equal to zero to a hypothesis. Given that
a person has no information concerning a hypothesis, he
would be naturally more comfortable assigning a value of
zero to his belief in contrast to a non-zero probability
representing maximum entropy. Even though this approach
provides a more intuitive was to express ignorance than
Bayesian probability it is still a very ambiguous
representation. Although both Bayesian probability and
Mycin offer reasonable methods to simulate ignorance,
neither approach offers a representation as explicit as the
Dempster-Shafer theory -
3.5.3 Prior Probability
- Problem of Subjectivity
All three of these approaches rely on the integrity of
the subjective beliefs of experts. They differ in that
Bayesian probability also requires prior probabilities or
beliefs. Prior probabilities are considered to be more
subjective than conditional probabilities and are often
disregarded as being valid. The reason that prior
probabilities are considered to be highly subjective is
because prior to any evidence being known the
* state'
of the
world of each individual expert may be quite different and
therefore their stated prior probabilities may vary
tremendously. In Mycin, though the theoretical
basis of MB
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and MD included prior probabilities experts are not
specifically asked to estimate their prior beliefs. In
practice, experts are asked to estimate the certainty
factors, which combine both prior probability (P(H)) and
conditional probability (P(H|E)) into one value. These
questions concerning the validity or quality of prior
probabilities are not in themselves sufficient reason to
abandon probability theory. Expert systems can be designed
in such ways that they can improve and refine our initial
estimates as new evidence is gathered [Nutter, 1987].
Many still maintain that the strict statistical
concept of probability is the only legitimate
interpretation. However, in the majority of cases the
required statistical data to support this approach is simply
not available. Therefore, the idea of a subjective or
personal probability must be applied to support decision
making and problem solving.
3.5.4 Statistical Independence & Mutual Exclusivity
Statistical independence and mutual exclusivity are
assumptions that can be found in all three theories
discussed here. In most situations, these assumptions
predicate more information than is actually known and in
many cases, especially
those involving medical diagnosis,
are actually known to be
invalid. The repercussions of
these assumptions on the outcome of these
approaches is not




A number of studies have been conducted on Mycin to
verify the integrity of the program results. One such study
was designed to compare the certainty factor computed from
known probability data ( P(H) and P(H|E) are known ) and the
certainty factor computed using the combining functions and
known values for MB and MD. The outcome of this study
showed that the largest descrepancies between the two CF
values were due to interrelated evidence and longer
reasoning chains [Buchanan, Shortliffe, 1984]. However,
their overall impact of these assumptions in Mycin appears
to be rather small due to the predominant use of relatively
short reasoning chains. [Adams, 1984].
A number of solutions have been offered to help
accomodate the restrictions of independence and mutual
exclusivity. One such solutions suggests that all
non-
independent evidence be grouped together into a single
piece of evidence or a single rule. It is important to
note that though this may help solve the problem
theoretically it makes the actual implementation much
more
unmanageable by increasing the difficulty in obtaining
rules. There also have been a number of heuristic
techniques proposed to avoid the restrictions of mutual
exclusivity. A good example can be seen in the expert
system Caduceus. [Charniak,McDermott, 1984].
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3.5.5 Inferencing Methods
A key function of expert systems is the ability to make
decisions and draw inferences from the available
information. It is here that the Dempster-Shafer Theory
falls short by not offering any effective means for decision
making. In the Dempster-Shafer approach, ignorance and
uncertainty are represented directly in belief functions and
are carried through the combination process [Barnett,
1981]]. The BEL and PL functions can be calculated for each
statement defining the bounds of the evidential interval.
There is presently no accepted mechanism for decision making
based on these bounds. Possibly the value for Bel or PI
could be used solely for decision making. However, which of
these values should be used is unknown [Barnett, 1981].
The Bayesian approach differs in that it masks our
ignorance in the prior probabilites. The probabilities
calculated by the updating mechanism can be used in making
decisions that will minimize the expected loss [Thompson,
1985] . The reasoning methods used in Mycin were implemented
on this basis in conjunction with a deductive style of
reasoning. There are a number of drawbacks to deductive
reasoning which have limited the success of
Mycin. In most
cases, deductive reasoning does not represent how
people
actually make decisions. People tend to
incorporate a more
inductive-style of reasoning based on their
personal
intuition and perception of the
-state'
of their situation.
Inductive reasoning usually results
in a solution that best
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represents or is most typical of the data or evidence.
Deductive reasoning, also has been shown to have severe
shortcomings with default reasoning or typicality.
Typicality-based uncertainty, which is involved in
generalizations such as "Birds Fly", centers on whether an
individual has a property that is typical of other things of




The theory of fuzzy sets was first introduced by Lotfi
Zadeh in 1965, due to his strong interest in the analysis of
complex systems [Kandel, 1982]. Since that time, the
development of fuzzy set theory has grown significantly.
Possibility Theory was later introduced by Zadeh in 1978 as
a development of fuzzy sets. Unlike probability-based
approaches, Possibility Theory offers a formal method of
representing uncertainty due to vague concepts or hypotheses
where distinct boundaries or definitions do not exist.
Fuzzy set theory is particularly well suited for natural
language applications where vague linguistic variables such
as tall, short, young etc. are prevalent. Fuzzy set theory
is a generalization of abstract set theory, in that all the
definitions and theorems that apply to fuzzy sets also hold
true for non-fuzzy sets [Kandel, 1982].
The basis of fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic will be
presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
Possibility Theory will be examined in section
4.3 as a
model for representing
uncertainty. A discussion of how
ignorance can be represented in possiblity theory also will
be included. A comparison of both Possibility and
Probability Theory will be discussed
in the final section.
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4.1 Definition of Fuzzy Sets
Since a fuzzy set is a generalization of a crisp set,
it is first necessary to understand the concept of a crisp
set. In a crisp set, each element of the universal set is
assigned a value of either 1 or 0 indicating whether it is
contained within or is strictly outside of the specified
set. In describing a crisp set, all elements of the
universal set are separated into two groups, members and
non-members. A sharp distinctive boundary delineates the
members from the non-members. Formally, in a crisp set each
element is defined by a discrimination function:
1 if and only if XA
uA (X)
=
0 if and only if XC A
An example of a crisp set is the set of all integer
temperature values in the range [50F, 100F] . Given the
universal set X = (0,30,60,90,120), each element is assigned
a value of 1 or 0 indicting it membership in the set (T) , as







Figure 4 . l
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It can be determined with certainty that each element is
either contained within the set or is strictly outside of
the set. A sharp distinctive boundary delineates members
and non-members. In a fuzzy set, this sharp boundary is
replaced by a gradual * fuzzy' boundary.
In defining a fuzzy set, each element of the universal
set is assigned a value in a specified range representing
the membership grade of each element in respect to the
specified set. This is formally represented by the
following membership function:
Let X = Universal set,
uA : X -> [0,1]
Where [0,1] denotes the interval of real numbers
from 0 to 1 [Klir,Folger, 1988].
As in a crisp set, if an element of the universal set
is clearly contained within the specified set it is assigned
a value of 1. Likewise, if an element is strictly outside
of the set it is assigned a value of 0. A fuzzy set differs
from a crisp set in that it also allows the assignment of
values in the range of 0 to 1 representing an elements
position in the vague boundary between being either wholly
within or outside of the set. Clearly, a crisp set
represents the special case of a fuzzy set when no
uncertainty or vagueness
exists concerning the membership of
the elements in the specified set. In this case, all
elements of the universal set would be assigned
values of 0
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or 1, and no elements would exist in the -fuzzy' boundary.
To help illustrate the concepts of a fuzzy set,
consider the following two fuzzy sets: COLD (set of cold
temperatures) and HOT (set of hot temperatures) . Given the
universal set, X = (0,30,40,50,60,70,80,100), each element
is assigned a value in the range of 0 to 1 representing its
membership in the particular fuzzy set (Figure 4.2).










In the fuzzy set HOT, the elements (40,50,60,70)
are in the
boundary area, indicating that there is some
level of
uncertainty or vagueness concerning
their membership in the
fuzzy set. This uncertainty is
due to the vagueness
inherent in the linguistic concept of hot. The
amount of
uncertainty or
vagueness is indicated by the size of the
fuzzy boundary- It is
important to note that the membership
grades assigned to each element are
subjective in nature,
representing the
degree that a person believes
that an
element belongs in the particular fuzzy
set.
The support of a fuzzy set is
equal to the crisp set of
all the elements that have
non-zero values. From Figure
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4.2, the support of the fuzzy set, HOT, is
SUPP(HOT) = (40,50,60,70,80,100)
A fuzzy set is considered to be normalized if at least one
element of the set is assigned the highest possible
membership grade. The height of a fuzzy set is equal to the
highest membership grade assigned to any of its elements.
Both fuzzy sets, HOT and COLD, are normalized with a height
of l.
Fuzzy modifiers such as very, really, usually, etc.,
can be applied to linguistic variables to create new fuzzy
sets or subsets. Generally speaking, the subsets resulting
from fuzzy modifiers are more concise and, therefore, less
uncertain. Fuzzy modifiers are often referred to in the
literature as linguistic hedges [Kandel, 1982]. As an
illustration, if the modifier *very' is applied to the fuzzy
set, HOT, a new fuzzy subset, VERYHOT,- is created. As shown
in Figure 4.3, the support of the subset, VERYHOT, is half


























of the support for the subset, HOT, indicating that the new
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fuzzy set is a more concise set. The number of elements
found in the fuzzy boundary has also decreased to include
only two elements indicating that the new fuzzy subset is
less uncertain or vague.
4.2 Fuzzy Logic
In classical or two-valued logic, every hypothesis is
assigned a value of either true (1) or false (0) . In other
words, each hypothesis is considered to be very clear and
precise, either being completely true or completely false.
It is the goal of fuzzy logic to provide a method to do
approximate reasoning with imprecise or fuzzy propositions
[Klir,Folger, 1988]. In fuzzy logic, each hypothesis is
assigned a value in the range of [0,1] representing the
degree that the hypothesis is either true or false. It is
important to note, that in the case that no uncertainty
exists, fuzzy logic can be reduced to two-valued logic.
As a basis for fuzzy logic, the functions of union,
intersection and complement have been defined in fuzzy set
theory as follows:
Let A and B be fuzzy subsets of X
1) Complement of a fuzzy subset
uA(X)
= 1 - uA(X)




3) Union of two fuzzy subsets
UAUB<X) = max[uA(X),uB(X) ]
The complement, intersection and union functions are
illustrated in Figure 4.4, as they pertain to the fuzzy
subsets, HOT and VERYHOT.
TEMP HOT VERYHOT HOT U VERYHOT HOT D VERYHOT HOT
0 0 0 0 0 1
30 0 0 0 0 1
40 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.9
50 0.3 0 0.3 0 0.7
60 0.4 0 0.4 0 0.6
70 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.3
80 1 0.8 1 0.8 0
FIGURE 4.4
In fuzzy logic, an imprecise or fuzzy proposition can
consist of fuzzy predicates (hot, cold) , fuzzy modifiers
(very, usually) and also fuzzy truth values (very true,
fairly false) [Klir,Folger, 1988]. For example, consider
the fuzzy proposition ^Yesterday was a cold day. The truth
value of this propostion depends on the membership grade of
the actual temperature recorded yesterday in the fuzzy
subet, COLD, and also on the strength of the truth being
claimed. Consider for example the following two claims:
Yesterday was a cold day is very
true'
x
Yesterday was a cold day is fairly
true'
Each of these claims will result in different truth values
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based on the fuzzy set representing the appropriate truth
claim expressed.
Fuzzy truth values can be represented by their own
fuzzy subsets as described below. Given a universal set, U,
of real numbers in the range, [0,1], and assuming that truth
can be represented by these numerical values, varying
degrees of membership can be assigned to the linguistic
variables, true and false. Consider for example that
absolutely true is represented numerically by the value of 1
and absolutely false is represented by the value of 0.
Within this unit interval, as the membership grade of true
increases towards 1 the membership grade for false would
decrease toward 0. Fuzzy modifiers such as very or fairly
now can be applied to these fuzzy sets to create new fuzzy
subsets as shown in Figure 4.5.
U True Fairly True False Very False
0 0 0 1 1
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.8
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5
0.6 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.2
0.8 0.8 1 0.2 0
1 1 1 0 0
Figure 4 ,.5
4.3 Possibility Theory
Possibility Theory was initially proposed by Zadeh in
1978 as a development of fuzzy set theory. The main purpose
behind Possibility Theory was to provide a good formalism to
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deal with the inherent fuzziness found in much of the
information that is used to make decisions. Possibility
theory is centered around the concept of a possibility
distribution.
A possibility distribution, denoted as TTX, is defined
as a fuzzy constraint on the values that may be assigned to
X. Zadeh defines the possibility distribution in terms of a
fuzzy restriction as follows:
Let F be a fuzzy subset and U be the Universal set.
Let X be a variable taking values in U, and let F act as
a fuzzy restriction.
Then the proposition "X is F" translates into
R(X) = F.
Associated with this proposition is a possibility




This possiblity distribution function of X is defined




As an example, consider the proposition 'Yesterday was
a cold day'. In this example the fuzzy set, COLD, restricts
the values that can be assigned to yesterday's temperature.
In formal terms, the above propostion can be written as
R (Temperature (Yesterday) ) = Cold
In order to relate this idea of a fuzzy restriction to a
possibility distribution, consider the temperature, 40F,
66
whose degree of membership in the fuzzy set, COLD, is 0.8.
The degree of membership, 0.8, is interpreted as a degree of
compatibility of 4OF with the concept of cold. Now by





we can state that the degree of possibility that
yesterday was 40F is 0.8 given the fact that yesterday was a
cold day. The compatibility, 0.8, of the value 4 OF with the
concept cold becomes the possibility of that temperature
given that the proposition is true.
The possibility distribution, TTx(u) , is numerically equal
to the membership function and therefore may be assigned
values in the range of [0,1]. The possibility distribution
for the fuzzy set, COLD, is TTX
= 1/0 + 1/30 + 0.8/40 +
0.5/50 + 0.3/60 + 0.1/70 + 0/80 + 0/90 + 0/100 where each
term is read as the possibility that X is 40 given that X is
cold is equal to 0.8. Although for a given set, a
possibility distribution may appear to be very similar to a
probability distribution, there lies a number of fundamental
differences between the two which will be investigated in
the section 4.5.
4 . 4 Ignorance
In Possibility Theory, total ignorance is represented
by a possibility distribution consisting of all l's.
TTx(u) = (1,1,1 1}
Generally speaking, the less specific the evidence or
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information, the larger the possibility distribution
representing the high degree of uncertainty. Hence, total
ignorance is represented by the
x largest'
possibility
distribution, consisting of all l's [Klir,Folger, 1988]. On
the other hand, the situation where we have perfect evidence
and consequently no uncertainty, would be represented by the
following possibility distribution.
TTx(u) = (1,0,0,0...0)
It seems naturally intuitive to state that in the absence of
any relevant evidence, all propositions are possible.
Unfortunately, in possibility theory we are still forced to
address all propositions as singletons as we were in
probability theory -
4.5 Comparison of Possibility and Probability
Both Probability and Possibility Theory offer methods
to represent uncertainty that is found in situations
involving problem solving and decision making. However, the
type of uncertainty that is best handled by these two
theories is quite different. Probabilities are well suited
to represent the uncertainty inherent in our belief of a
particular hypothesis, given the evidence and information
that is currently available. This uncertainty lies in the
ambiguity associated with being faced with many well defined
alternative hypotheses or solutions. On the other hand,
possibilities best represent the uncertainty that results
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from the use of vague or indistinct concepts or linguistic
terms.
As an iterative part of the decision process, a person
must choose between the available alternative hypotheses,
based on their belief that a particular hypothesis is true.
In this type of environment, the alternative solutions are
clear and well defined, the uncertainty lies with our belief
of which alternative to choose. This type of uncertainty,
most prevalent in diagnostic and problem solving
environments, is best handled by a probabilistic approach.
For instance, suppose the problem that we are faced with is
to determine a person's age. Our alternative solutions, in
this example, can be viewed as well defined crisp sets such
as the set of all people 16 years old. The information we
have concerning this person's age is limited to the
following two observations; the person drives a car and the
person is currently attending highschool. Given this
information we may assign our probabilistic beliefs as
follows:
Age 15 16 17 18 19 20
T05 75 725 725 TI 705
In this example, our xbest
guess' is 16 and consequently is
assigned the highest value. The uncertainty is inherent in
the information or lack of information that we have
available to us to support our decision. On the other hand,
the alternative solutions are very clear and certain. If we
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were given perfect evidence, we could predict with certainty
the person's age. Possibilities represent the uncertainty
due to vagueness found in situations where distinct
definitions do not exist. Possibility theory concentrates
on the actual meaning of the information rather than the
measure of it [Klir,Folger, 1987]. This type of uncertainty
is prevalent in natural language applications. For
example, consider the task of determining whether a person
is young, given their age. In this example, the problem is
to determine how this person's age relates to the vague
concept of young. Here the uncertainty lies in the
subjective interpretation of the concept young.
The difference between probabilities and possibilites
can be best illustrated by the following example given by
Zadeh [Zadeh, 1977]. Consider the statement "Hans ate X
eggs for breakfast" with X taking values in U = (1,2,3,4..).
A possibility distribution, P(u) , may be associated with X
by interpreting P(u) to be the degree of ease with which
Hans can eat u eggs. A probability distribution, Pr(u),
can also be associated with X by interpreting Pr(u) as the
probability of Han's eating u eggs for breakfast. The
possibility and probability distributions associated with X
may look as follows:
u 12345678
TT(u) 1111 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2
Pr(u) 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 0 0 0 0
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From this example, we can observe that a high degree of
possibility does not imply a high degree of probability, nor
does a low degree of probability imply a low degree of
possibility- However, Zadeh did propose that there does
exist a weak heuristic link between probabilities and
possibilities which he called the -possibility/probability
consistency principle'. This principle is based on the
observation that as the possibility of an event decreases so
does the probability of the event. In other words, if an
event is impossible it is also improbable. A further
understanding of the differences between probability and
possibility can be gained by comparing the concepts of the
probability and the possibility measure. A probability
measure represents the chance that a hypothesis will occur,
based on certain evidence. A possibility measure
represents the degree that a hypothesis is feasible.
Probability measures are represented by the sum of the
probabilities of the events in the distribution space,
whereas possibility measures are represented by the maximum
value of the possibility distribution. A possibility
measure is similar to the plausibility measure of the
Dempster-Shafer Theory. In fact, it has been proposed that
possibility measures are a
special subset of plausibility
measures [Klir,Folger, 1988].
With the introduction of possibility theory began a
debate concerning the validity
of the new theory and its
applicability. Specifically, Cheeseman claims
that a






eliminating the need for a new theory [Cheeseman, 1986].
Cheeseman argues that a possibility can be represented as
the probability that "it is possible that event X occurs"
instead of the proposition "event X occurs". One problem
with this interpretation is that in the first proposition
our event space does not include all possible values of X,
whereas in the later case it does [Bhatnagar,Kanal, 1986].
In support of his arguments, Cheeseman further identifies
the underlying dependency assumptions for the max/min rules
found in fuzzy logic as severe shortcomings. For example





In the case that A and B are mutually exclusive, this rule
will state their possibility as the minimum of the two and
it should instead be stated as zero. However, Probability
Theory also suffers from certain assumptions. In fact,
Cheeseman defends the underlying independence assumptions
found in probability by stating that in order to make
decisions with uncertain information one is forced to make
assumptions. In the defense of Possibility Theory, Zadeh
contends that the vagueness surrounding a particular concept
is not equal to the uncertainty about its truth
value in a
particular context. Although fuzzy set theory lacks much of
the empirical verification found in probability theory,
it
72
offers a good method to reason with a type of uncertainty




The preceding sections have dealt with various numeric
approaches to uncertainty- Each of these approaches were
based on unique mathematical formalisms based on their own
set of requirements and assumptions. One requirement shared
by each of these methods, is that the expert must express
his uncertainty in terms of specific numbers. This has been
viewed as a severe shortcoming due to the fact that people
often find it difficult to translate their beliefs into hard
numbers. Consequently, many have argued that non-numeric
approaches should be further investigated as more realistic
methods for modeling uncertainty.
Non-monotonic logic offers a good non-numeric approach,
and as such the type of uncertainty that it best represents
is quite different from the uncertainty represented by the
previous numerical approaches. Some of the better known
non-monotonic logics include McCarthy's circumscription,
Reiter's default logic and McDermott and Doyle's non
monotonic logic [Shoham, 1987]. Each of these logical
systems offer unique approaches each worthy of
consideration. For the purposes of this thesis, however,
the discussions in the following sections will be limited to




The ability to revise our beliefs based on the most
current information is essential in modeling environments
that are changing or uncertain. In order to truly reflect
the underlying uncertainty of a hypothesis, incomplete and
contradictory information also must be considered.
Classical or traditional logic is monotonic in nature and,
therefore, does not allow the revision of previous
conclusions as new information is obtained. Consequently,
traditional logic cannot be effectively applied to dynamic
problem solving situations having incomplete or uncertain
information.
Non-monotonic logic, on the other hand, allows previous
conclusions to be invalidated or revised based on
inconsistencies that arise from new information. Non
monotonic logic is based on first order predicate calculus
and requires that each variable is restricted to a single
value. Consequently, in the case that the evidence is
either contradictory or missing, assumptions must be made up
front to resolve any conflicts, and a single value must be
assigned. It should be noted that due to this restriction
there is presently no way to represent ignorance with this
method. In the numerical approaches discussed in the
previous chapters, hypotheses could be partially
believed.
In the case of non-montonic logic, each hypothesis is either
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believed or disbelieved based on the initial assumptions
that are applied. The uncertainty is masked in the
suppositions made and is not carried through the decision
making process. Therefore, the level of confidence we have
in our decision strongly depends on the nature of these
underlying assumptions.
5.2 Modal Logic
The non-monotonic logic introduced by McDermott and
Doyle incorporates modal operators to represent the idea of
"consistency". In this logic, classical logic is extended
by adding modality, M, as follows:
Infer (Mp) from the inability to infer (NOT p)
Here Mp is the modal operator representing
"consistency"
and
can be read as "p is consistent with the
theory"
[Maselli,
1985] . The modal operators allow a contingent conclusion to
be drawn based on the fact that there is no evidence to the
contrary- As new information is received, the previous





2) PENGUIN -> BIRD
A NOT (CAN-FLY)
3 ) BIRD
In this theory we can prove
4 ) CAN-FLY
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the premises of 1,2 and 3. Now if the following new
information is received
5) PENGUIN
we find that our previous conclusion (4) is now inconsistent
and must be re-evalutated. The modal operator changes its
meaning based on the context of the situation.
5.3 Doyle's Truth Maintenance System
Doyle's Truth Maintenance System (TMS) provides a
framework for updating and revising models as new information
is obtained. The TMS is a program that maintains the
knowledge base of a reasoner in a tree structure. In this
tree structure each node represents a hypothesis and the
children of each node represent the various justifications
and assumptions. In turn, each child node may contain
hypotheses and justifications. If the system receives new
input that is inconsistent with the hypothesis or theorem,
TMS revises the necessary assumptions in the tree in order
to restore the system to consistency. TMS also will inform
the user of all the changes that were made.
TMS has been able to effectively demonstrate a non
monotonic logic system. The decision reached by TMS,
however, does not explicitly reflect the amount of
underlying uncertainty in the assumptions. In large expert
systems, with longer inferencing chains, the system response




Probability theory has played an important role in
modeling uncertainty in problem solving environments for
many years. This can be seen not only in the Bayesian
Probability Theory but also as the basis for a number of
subsequent theories such as Mycin certainty factors and the
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence. In all three of these
theories, probabilities are defined as a subjective measure
of belief, in contrast to the traditional frequency ratio
approach.
In Bayesian probability, the probability or
'chance'
that an event will occur, represented by a value in the
range [0,1], is attached directly to the event. In general,
Bayesian probability has experienced limited success due to
the large volume of data required and the resulting
computational complexity when applied in large expert
systems. Its limited success is also due in part to its
lack of expressiveness in the representation of partial
beliefs, especially for ignorance and
'fuzzy'
events.
Mycin represented a tremendous breakthrough by offering
one of the first workable implementations of a reasoning
model that incorporates uncertainty. In Mycin, a
probabilistic weight called a certainty factor is used to
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represent one's degree of belief. The theoretical basis for
certainty factors lies in confirmation theory.
Consequently, the value assigned to a certainty factor
represents the degree of belief that the available evidence
supports the hypothesis. One of the goals in developing
this reasoning model was to avoid strict Bayesian
probability and its inherent assumptions and restrictions.
It has been shown, however, that a substantial part of this
model can be derived from probability theory, and
consequently it suffers from some of the same assumptions,
such as statistical independence. Much of Mycin's success
has been attributed to its more simplified model, in
comparison to Bayesian probability- It's short inferencing
chains have minimized the effects of the independence and
mutual exclusivity assumptions.
The Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence uses the same
calculus of probability as the Bayesian theory, however, it
applies it in a much different way. This approach is based
on numerical degrees of support based on evidence. In other
words, the
'chance' is attached to whether the evidence
supports the hypothesis. One notable advantage of this
theory is that the evidence accumulated by the expert does
not bear on a single hypothesis but instead on all possible
subsets of the hypothesis set. This provides a truer
representation of the expert's beliefs and also allows an
explicit representation of ignorance. Drawbacks of the
Dempster-Shafer Theory of evidence include the
lack of an
effective inferencing method and difficulties in defining
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frames of discernment in complex domains.
Probability-based theories are effective for expressing
partial beliefs in evidence and hypotheses where the
uncertainty lies in the context of the hypotheses. These
approaches would be best applied to domains that are well
defined and where the data is available. It is important to
realize that no mathematical model can be expected to give
reasonable results unless all of the underlying restrictions
and assumptions are followed.
Fuzzy set and Possibility theories, developed by Zadeh,
offer formal methods of representing uncertainty due to
vague concepts and consequently are very well suited for
natural language applications. Possibility theory
represents the uncertainty due to unclear or imprecise
definitions of the actual meaning of information. In this
theory, degrees of membership are used to relate hypotheses
to vague or
'fuzzy'
concepts. In turn, fuzzy logic offers
the functional methodology to do approximate reasoning with
fuzzy propositons. A possibility measure represents the
feasibility of a hypothesis, whereas a probability measure
represents the chance that a hypothesis will occur.
Possibility suffers from its own set of restrictions and
assumptions such as the underlying dependency restrictions
found in the max/min rules. Many have been skeptical of
Possibility Theory since it presently
lacks much of the
empirical testing found in probability
theory.
Non-monotonic logic offers a non-numeric approach to
80
handling uncertainty and, therefore, avoids the difficult
translations of beliefs into hard numbers. McDermott and
Doyle's non-monotonic logic allows conclusions to be revised
as new information is received by incorporating modal
operators. These modal operators are used to represent the
"consistency" in the model, thereby allowing us to jump to
conclusions in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Non-monotonic logic is effective in modeling default
reasoning in environments with missing or incomplete
information.
In conclusion, there is not one global theory that can
provide a panacea for all situations of uncertainty.
Probability-based approaches are best in situations where
our uncertainty lies in the evidential context of a
hypothesis. The Dempster-Shafer Theory appears to be the
most expressive approach, especially in describing
ignorance. Fuzzy set theory should be used when our
uncertainty is due to the vagueness of the
information.
Non-monotonic logic is applicable in generalizations based
on typicality allowing a method for default
reasoning.
In order to model human reasoning completely in expert
systems, we would need to
combine all these modes of
uncertainty into one reasoning
system. In the majority of
domains people must make decisions by incorporating all
types of uncertainties including partial evidential
information, vagueness and
generalizations. In order to
ensure that our information is not misrepresented,
systems
need to be developed that allow
experts to represent all
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their different types of uncertainty with the most
appropriate method. The difficulty lies in successfully
combining the numbers from these different methods into
rules allowing good inferences to be made. Unfortunately,
these types of systems though ideal are not currently
developed. The best alternative at present is to choose the
best theory for the particular domain, being aware of the
limitations and trade-offs that are made.
It is important to remember that not all of the
difficulty in developing reasoning systems that handle
uncertainty is with the representation of
the information
and inferencing methods. Many of the limitations are
due to
the difficulty in acquiring all the
information describing
the full state of the expert's world or domain.
Consequently, the knowledge base
that we begin with is
usually incomplete.
All in all the realm of human
reasoning is extemely
diverse and complex, and no one theory
will have the global key to the answer.
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